Kollengode S Venkataraman (Written in October 1999)
In the checkered history of post-colonial South Asia, instances of missed opportunities having disastrous consequences are countless. But nothing comes anywhere close to the way Pakistan squandered the global goodwill it had after the Lahore summit last February between its prime minister Nawaz Sharif and his Indian counterpart Vajpayee. After the Cold War, only North & South Koreas, and India & Pakistan, which strangely share common languages, culture, and ethos, are still at each other’s throats. Even Israelis, Palestinians & Arabs, and Irish Catholics & Protestants are making a new beginning.
Therefore, when Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee sagaciously shared roti and sipped chilled lassi with Premier Nawaz Sharif in Lahore, and Sharif in turn serenaded Vajpayee, even South Asian cynics became guarded optimists thinking that the wretched there, after all, may get their meager share of the Peace Dividend through decreased hostility, improved trade, and reduced spending on the military. But thanks to Pakistan’s misadventure in Kargil, this was not to be.
Kargil Incursions Are Confidence Shattering: After Pakistan’s betrayal in May soon after the Lahore Summit, India feels as if it choked on the proverbial haddis (bones) while chewing on the spicy kabab. In conversations, Indians refer to historical betrayals since Mohammad Gazni’s time in the 11th century that are stereotypically woven into Indian folklore, precisely when we need to break away from these stereotypes. Pakistanis talk of the diabolical Bania-Brahmin nexus.
Even as Mian Sharif talked eloquently in Lahore about the need for a new beginning in South Asia, Western media reports now say that he was either aware of, or approved, his army’s preparation for a somersault. When the mutilated dead bodies of Indian soldiers arrived in India in May, it was obvious that the Pakistani military’s only mission was to torpedo its own government’s peace overture to India.
No Comfort for India: Even though India was not cowed down in Kargil, it can draw little comfort. If Sharif indeed knew and approved his army’s preparation, Indians legitimately feel betrayed. If Sharif did not know about it, it is more worrisome. How do you negotiate with a prime minister who cannot control his army, or does not even know his army’s preparation for war with its neighbor? Worst of all, what is the guarantee that whatever treaty India signs with the nominal prime minister in Islamabad will be honored by the Pakistani military establishment, which is the real center of power there?
In any case, one can understand for another decade if India thinks that even as one hand reaches out to Pakistan seeking peace, let the other hand be ready to draw the gun, just in case.
Possible Pakistani Rationalization: Nawaz Sharif has a steam-rolling majority in his parliament. He further consolidated power by having his hand-picked men as the Supreme Court chief justice, the chief of the powerful army, and the nation’s president, and then clipping the president’s wings. Vajpayee, having lost his wafer-thin majority in the Lok Sabha, was wobbling as the caretaker prime minister facing elections.
World attention was on Kosovo, where the mighty Christian West was protecting the Muslim Albanians from the Serb Christians. So, the Pakistani Khakis might have thought the West can understand the “oppression” of the Muslim minority by the Hindu majority. But in Kashmir, Muslims are in the majority.
But consider these: Pakistan-supported Islamic militants have unleashed ethnic cleansing in Kashmir by driving out Hindus using murder and rape. Besides, India has more Muslims than the whole of Pakistan. Pakistan has its own versions of ethnic and intra-Islamic religious strife (Punjabis vs. the rest, and Sunnis vs. Shias and the Ahmadias).
A cynical thought: No Pakistani prime minister has survived without military support, and the military always hemmed in its prime ministers. Therefore, did Sharif play a win-win game so that he could discredit his military if the Kargil invasion failed, and yet take credit if it succeeded?
Multinational Jihads: The Indian military establishment was caught off-guard in the early days when the so-called Kashmiri Mujahideen (freedom fighters) succeeded in crossing the Line of Control established in 1971. It is “so-called” because, as the Indian government claimed, and recent Western intelligence concurred, most of the Kashmiri Mujahideen are actually Pakistani military regulars in disguise. Despite this, Pakistan wants the world to believe that it was only providing moral, political, and diplomatic support for the Kashmiri jihadis (Islamic holy warriors). Even Pakistanis find this difficult to believe.
Pakistan also supplies sophisticated weapons to the Jihadis, and by its constant refrain to Jihad and the Islamic ummah (family), it also invokes religion in the conflict. That the ummah is not monolithic is of no relevance to Pakistan. Besides, outside mercenaries — Afghanis, Chinese Muslim Tribals, Palestinians, Jordanians, Saudis, Libyans, Algerians, and Iraqis — were among the dead Mujahideens in Kashmir. In the globalized world, even “freedom” fighting is a multinational enterprise!
But wars have their own strange logic. After the undeclared Kargil war, the wobbly Vajpayee in India has become strong, and the Mian with the mandate in Pakistan looks shaky. We may never know why Sharif cut short his official China visit and met with President Clinton at the Blair House on the red-white-and-blue July 4th, which also was a holy Sunday.
China too Occupies Part of Kashmir: Mercifully, the region has averted one more large-scale war, thanks to Pakistan getting isolated internationally; its failure to garner the support of even its ally China; its inability to build domestic support for an all-out war; and its dismal economy.(With Pakistan’s defense spending over 6% of GDP, interest on loans and military spending alone exceed its tax revenue.) Since China too occupies a part of Kashmir, will Pakistan extend the Kashmiri Jihad to China too?
Pakistani English media harshly commented on their Kargil misadventure along two lines. Many wrote that their Kargil offensive was a disaster because their government did not think through its domestic and global ramifications, given its poor economy. Right wingers were furious that their army’s brilliant tactical military victory was squandered by diplomatic ineptitude and lack of political will to carry through.
Despite the few early hiccups (such as poor military-civilian-political interfaces on intelligence matters), India reacted with a coordinated military, bureaucratic, political, and diplomatic response, while at the same time not letting the situation get out of control. India also took the public into confidence and used the media to report casualties. For a change, its agriculture sector was strong. Its economy, though badly skewed, was vibrant. A strong foreign exchange reserve also helped. After Vajpayee’s politically risky Lahore initiative, world saw India differently.
The Cold War Lessons: Wars are no more won on the battlefields alone. The US won the Cold War without firing a single shot and without losing its men in battle with the USSR. But it waged a 50-year war on the economic and technological fronts, and in one-upmanship in military preparedness. In this war on endurance, the enemy was worn down economically and psychologically, and eventually imploded. The cost in terms of time and dollars was enormous. But the bloodshed was minuscule compared with the millions who died in World Wars I and II.
Military Preparedness Might Avoid Wars: For the time being, Trust is not a word in the Indo-Pakistani diplomatic lexicon. Therefore, though costly, military preparedness to avoid future Kargils, while negotiating with each other is a realistic option for India and Pakistan. This at least will avoid the hysteria of hatred war unleashes. In South Asia, hatred lingers long after the war, often spilling into sports and performing arts.
This may also avoid the killing and maiming of the most able-bodied young men in combat, and ruining the lives of their widows, wives, children, and parents. Remember, the socioeconomically disadvantaged are in disproportionately large numbers among foot-soldiers in all nations.
According to a recent Times of India article, in India, recruitment for jawans (soldiers), usually from traditional “military families” and from vernacular-educated poorer families, are filled easily. But 10,000 officers’ positions — filled by English-educated college graduates from the middle class — remain vacant. Not many from the “nonmilitary” middle class want to take the hardship duty in the military and risk their lives. And the Indian upper crust rarely sends its children to the military.
Where Should South Asia Go? All meaningful indicators of progress – literacy rates, infant mortality, mortality of women during pregnancy and childbirth, potable water, power supply, primary healthcare, the level of government corruption in both India and Pakistan are abysmal.
Therefore, both India and Pakistan must focus on good governance and bring their citizens to the standards of other Asian nations. There is nothing new in this cry. This is stressed ad nauseum by native-born social thinkers in South Asia, the well-known among them being late Prof. Mahbub Ul-Huq of Pakistan, who developed the UN’s Human Development Indicators, and Prof. Amartya Sen.
Towards this, what other option do we have other than reviving, both in letter and spirit, Vajpayee’s Lahore initiative? The alternative, whether an all-out war or continuing cross-border terrorism, bodes ill for the region’s poor. Only the recklessly irresponsible will pursue either of the options.
Nations having better living standards generally avoid wars and settle their disputes by negotiating, or win on other nonmilitary fronts such as trade, technology, industry, where the perceived enemy’s military prowess is made irrelevant. When both sides have a lot to lose, even reckless politicians and adventurous khakis count the cost of their military expeditions. When nations become prosperous, they become confident, and often, their enmity is morphed into competition. END